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If U.S. national missile
defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by
rogue states,1 then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a “normal” na-
tional security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility:
Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few
states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern
the risks to the United States of being vulnerable to rogue-state missiles and
the amount Washington should be willing to pay for insurance against these
risks.
What makes NMD special is its unavoidable connection to U.S. strategic nu-
clear policy and to the United States’ political relationships with Russia and
China. Both states view U.S. NMD as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabil-
ities and their relationship with the United States. If technically successful,
even the limited NMD planned by the Clinton administration might in some
scenarios undermine the capability of Russian nuclear forces. Russia will nd
limited NMD still more worrisome, anticipating that initial U.S. deployments
would be followed by larger ones. The NMD system under development poses
a larger and more immediate challenge to Chinese nuclear capabilities, which
currently include only about 20 single-warhead intercontinental-range mis-
siles. The Bush administration has called for more robust and ambitious
NMD—possibly increasing the number of ground-based interceptors and add-
ing sea- and space-based interceptors—which promises to make it still more
threatening.2 Moreover, some proponents favor deploying NMD not only
against rogue states, but also against China and possibly Russia. For example,
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2001, p. 1.
Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) reportedly said that “it’s easy to talk about North
Korea, Iran and Iraq, but . . . behind closed doors you hear some people ex-
pressing some concerns about ultimate threats like China.”3
Many proponents of NMD are relatively unconcerned about its effect on U.S.
relations with Russia and China. Early indications are that George W. Bush and
his administration are inclined toward this view. Although President Bush has
stated his desire to work with Russia “to develop a new foundation for world
peace and security,” his determination to “leave behind the constraints of the
ABM treaty” and deploy missile defenses as soon as possible reects the judg-
ment that the benets of NMD are much greater than the benets of coopera-
tion with Russia.4 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s characterization of
the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty as “ancient history” reects a simi-
lar perspective,5 because the ABM treaty, possibly in a signicantly amended
form, has an important role to play in future U.S. cooperation with Russia.
The ABM treaty may be ancient history, in the sense that it was designed to
deal with security issues that have been radically transformed, but the factors
that inuence international relations have not changed. U.S. security is still
inuenced by how other major powers understand Washington’s international
goals. Because Russia and China are not condent that the United States will
respect their vital interests, U.S. security policy, while pursuing its other re-
quirements, should avoid fueling their fears and triggering reactions that ulti-
mately would decrease U.S. security.
Consequently, the impact of NMD on U.S. relations with these major powers
should be a central consideration.6 Given that the threat posed by rogue states
has yet to materialize, may be delayed or eliminated by diplomacy, and can
probably be deterred if it does materialize, the United States should not deploy
NMD if this would seriously damage U.S. relations with Russia and China. Al-
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though this does not necessarily require preserving the ABM treaty in its cur-
rent form, it does require that the United States pursue cooperative policies
designed to minimize the security concerns of other major powers.
At the same time, if NMD could be made effective against rogue threats and
if the political costs with Russia and China could be minimized, then the case
against limited NMD becomes less clear-cut. Although rogue states would
most likely be deterred from attacking the United States with long-range bal-
listic missiles, this is not certain. At $60 billion,7 limited NMD is expensive but
would amount to less than 2 percent of the defense budget and 10 percent of
the procurement budget during the years it was being deployed, which is not
out of line with other procurement programs that can be described as insur-
ance against unlikely dangers. Thus the United States should explore whether
there are policies that would signicantly reduce the international political
costs of NMD and begin laying the groundwork for pursuing them, in case an
effective NMD system becomes feasible.8
The article begins with a brief review of emerging missile threats and the
ability of NMD systems to deal with them. Both the key threats and the NMD
technologies have changed dramatically since the Cold War.9 During the Cold
War, the case for missile defense focused on the massive Soviet nuclear force,
not on small nascent missile forces being built by small and medium powers.
Cold War NMD technology consisted of nuclear-armed interceptors and, dur-
ing the 1980s, unproven “star wars” concepts. Today the United States is com-
mitted to hit-to-kill interceptors. The NMD mission against small rogue forces
would be far less demanding than it was against the Soviet nuclear force, and
the technology currently under consideration is closer to maturity. Neverthe-
less the NMD system under development has little chance of being effective,
because states capable of deploying intercontinental-range missiles armed
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with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would also be able to deploy coun-
termeasures that would defeat the system.
Although this negative technological prognosis might appear sufcient to
end discussion of NMD, further analysis is required because there is a
signicant chance that the United States will deploy an NMD system even if it
is ineffective. During the Clinton years, broad-based support across the politi-
cal spectrum created substantial momentum toward deployment; the Bush ad-
ministration’s belief that NMD is essential to U.S. security increases this
momentum. In addition, it is possible that other NMD technologies—particu-
larly surface-based boost-phase systems—might be effective against small
threats in the future.
Consequently, we address the following strategic and political questions
raised by NMD:
· How do the strategic arguments surrounding limited NMD differ from those
that dened the U.S.-Soviet relationship?
· Should the United States pursue NMD against Russia? against China?
· How large are the potential security benets and costs of limited NMD?
· What policies might reduce the international political costs of limited NMD
vis-à-vis Russia and China?
· What are the implications of limited NMD for deep cuts and disarmament?
We argue that the United States should reject full-scale NMD against Russia
and China because the prospects for achieving an effective defense are small
(even if NMD becomes feasible against small rogue forces) and because the po-
litical costs would be large. Turning to effective limited NMD, we nd that on
balance the expected benets are small, and possibly negative. Rogue states
should be deterred by the United States’ massive conventional and nuclear re-
taliatory capabilities. There is, however, some chance that deterrence might
fail, in which case NMD might then reduce the attack’s damage. Contrary to
the hopes of many proponents, effective NMD is unlikely to provide other
benets. Limited NMD would not bolster deterrence of a rogue attack, nor
would it restore much leeway to U.S. foreign policy, because its effectiveness
would be uncertain and U.S. leaders would still be concerned about the vul-
nerability of U.S. cities. Still worse, limited NMD could bring military dangers
of its own: Russian reactions to U.S. NMD could increase the probability of ac-
cidental Russian missile launches, and NMD is unlikely to afford protection
against such attacks.
In the absence of ambitious efforts to engage Russia and China, whatever
benets effective limited NMD might provide would be greatly outweighed by
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its international political costs. Much of our analysis is devoted to exploring
how to minimize these costs. We identify a range of options for reducing Rus-
sian concerns, including NMD systems that could intercept rogue missiles but
not Russian missiles, arms control agreements that integrate offensive and de-
fensive limits, unilateral reductions in American counterforce capabilities, and
efforts to ensure Russia’s ability to respond to a rapid buildup of NMD. In the-
ory, these cooperative measures could greatly reduce, if not eliminate, Russian
concerns. U.S. options for reducing China’s concerns are less promising, be-
cause China is starting with a much smaller nuclear force. If effective NMD is
developed, dedicated U.S. pursuit of this full range of options for reducing
NMD’s international political costs should be a necessary, but not sufcient,
condition for proceeding with deployment.
These strategic solutions would be insufcient because all the key states—
the United States, Russia, and China—would be inclined to exaggerate the
threatening nature of one another’s policies. The United States would need
policies to minimize these exaggerations. Perhaps most important, U.S. leaders
would have to anticipate and accept the Chinese nuclear buildup that Ameri-
can NMD is likely to generate, and then work to establish a domestic consen-
sus that this buildup is consistent with China’s security requirements and does
not reect malign intentions.
Given the enormous technical and political challenges, we are skeptical of
NMD. Among the alternatives, surface-based boost-phase systems are least
problematic, because they are more likely to be effective against rogue missile
forces and have the best prospects for reassuring Russia and China that the
United States is not adopting a more competitive and threatening national se-
curity policy. The case against midcourse NMD is much more compelling—it
is unlikely to work, and it would generate signicant international tensions,
unless the United States is successful in pursuing ambitious cooperative poli-
cies, which are most likely beyond its reach.
Emerging ICBM and WMD Threats
In 1997 Congress established a bipartisan commission, with then former Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as chairman, to reassess the emerging inter-
continental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the United States. The
Rumsfeld Commission concluded that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq “would be
able to inict major destruction on the U.S. within about ve years of a deci-
sion to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of
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those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.
The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more
mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and re-
ports by the Intelligence Community.”10 The report challenged a 1995 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which had concluded that “in the next 15 years no
country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic
missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.”11
The Rumsfeld Commission’s assessment was more pessimistic than pre-
vious intelligence estimates partly because it put more emphasis on what a
state could do, particularly given the availability of foreign assistance, rather
than on what it was known to have done or was judged likely to do. The com-
mission stressed the importance of concealment and deception efforts by
emerging missile states. It also noted that because these states would not re-
quire high standards of safety and reliability—a single ight test might be
sufcient for operational deployment of an ICBM—the United States might
have little or no warning of deployment.
Shortly after the release of the Rumsfeld report, North Korea ight-tested a
three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan. Although a test was expected, the
existence of the third stage—which would allow the missile to deliver a small
payload to the United States—surprised the U.S. intelligence community and
seemingly conrmed the commission’s conclusions. A new NIE released in
1999 concluded: “We project that during the next 15 years the United States
will most likely face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, prob-
ably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.”12
The revised intelligence assessments all but ended ofcial debate about
whether the rogue-state missile threat was sufciently imminent to warrant
deployment of limited NMD, and led President Bill Clinton to sign the Missile
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Defense Act of 1999, which states: “It is the policy of the United States to
deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile
Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliber-
ate).”13 President Clinton emphasized that the act did not represent a decision
to deploy NMD, and that any such decision would be based on a continuing
assessment of the threat, the technical readiness and estimated cost of the
NMD system, and the impact of deployment on U.S. arms control and
nonproliferation objectives. The Bush administration has not fully outlined its
NMD policy, but appears to have concluded that the threat posed by emerging
missile states justies deployment of an NMD system.
Of the three emerging missile states of greatest concern,14 North Korea is
closest to elding an ICBM.15 A three-stage Taepo Dong 1 would be capable of
delivering a light payload to the United States, “albeit with inaccuracies that
would make hitting large urban targets improbable.”16 North Korea is devel-
oping a larger missile, the Taepo Dong 2; a three-stage version of this missile
could deliver a warhead weighing several hundred kilograms anywhere in the
United States.17 The Taepo Dong 2 has not been tested and its status is un-
known, but the U.S. intelligence community believes that it was ready for test-
ing as early as 1999.
According to the Rumsfeld Commission, “Iran now has the technical capa-
bility and resources to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar to
the [Taepo Dong 2], within ve years of a decision to proceed.”18 Intelligence
community analysts differ on forecasts of Iran’s rst ICBM test; some believe
it is likely by 2010 and very likely by 2015; others believe there is a less than
even chance of a test by 2015.19 Iraq is least far along, largely because its missile
program was severely damaged during the Gulf War and as a result of subse-
quent UN inspections, and because Iraq remains under international sanctions.
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Although some intelligence analysts believe that Iraq is likely to test an ICBM
by 2015, others believe this unlikely.20
The threat posed by a rogue missile depends on the type of warhead it car-
ries. Missiles armed with high-explosive warheads are not sufciently destruc-
tive to warrant their use on inaccurate long-range missiles or to justify the
construction of a limited NMD.21 At the opposite end of the spectrum are nu-
clear weapons. A rst-generation nuclear warhead, which might weigh 500 to
1,500 kilograms and have a yield of 10 to 20 kilotons,22 could kill tens of thou-
sands of people if used against a large U.S. city.
North Korea has the most advanced nuclear weapons program of the three
states examined here. It is believed to have produced, by the early 1990s,
enough plutonium for one or possibly two nuclear weapons. If true, North Ko-
rea should have been able to build a reliable nuclear device. It is much less cer-
tain, however, that it would be able to produce, without nuclear testing or
foreign assistance, a warhead small and light enough to be delivered by a
Taepo Dong 2 to U.S. territory. Iran and Iraq also have nuclear weapons pro-
grams, but unless they acquire signicant amounts of plutonium or highly en-
riched uranium from abroad, Iran probably is at least a decade away from
producing a usable nuclear weapon,23 and an Iraqi weapon is an even more
distant prospect.
All three countries are believed to possess chemical weapons, and to have or
be developing biological weapons.24 Chemical and biological weapons are of-
ten lumped together with nuclear weapons as “weapons of mass de-struction,”
but there are signicant differences in their potential to inict harm. Several
hundred kilograms of chemical agent could kill hundreds or even thousands
of people. Biological weapons are potentially much more lethal—tens of kilo-
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grams of anthrax could kill as many people as a rst-generation nuclear
weapon, if dispersed efciently under favorable weather conditions against an
unprotected population.25 These differences could have implications for NMD.
A country with a small number of missiles armed only with conventional or
chemical warheads probably would not be worth defending against. By com-
parison, the damage that could be inicted by nuclear weapons, and possibly
biological warheads, makes the case for NMD stronger.
Although many observers have concluded that at least one rogue state will
threaten the United States in the near future, diplomatic efforts might substan-
tially slow or even eliminate rogue missile and WMD programs. In fact,
signicant progress has been made with the most worrisome threat—North
Korea. In 1994 North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its pro-
gram to produce plutonium.26 The agreement has been a success so far, in the
sense that on-site inspections have veried that North Korea’s reactors and its
plutonium separation plant remain shut down. More recently, North Korea has
been engaged in negotiations with the United States to curb its ballistic missile
program. North Korea announced a moratorium on long-range missile tests,
and by November 2000 Washington and Pyongyang were close to an agree-
ment that would end North Korean development, testing, and production of
long-range missiles and exports of missile technology in exchange for eco-
nomic assistance and satellite launch services.27 A cutoff of North Korean ex-
ports could have a signicant impact on Iran’s long-range missile program,
which is heavily dependent on foreign assistance.28 Unfortunately, the Clinton
administration was unable to close the deal,29 and the Bush administration has
indicated reluctance to resume the negotiations.30
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In summary, in deciding whether to deploy NMD the United States faces an
uncertain threat from emerging missile states. It may be possible that North
Korea could deploy an ICBM armed with a nuclear or biological warhead
within ve years; most estimates see Iran as probably ten years off and Iraq as
fteen or more years away. The possibility of an early deployment by North
Korea or a surprise from Iran or Iraq puts pressure on the United States to be-
gin deploying an NMD system as soon as possible, given that deployment will
take many years to complete. On the other hand, it is also possible that diplo-
matic efforts will prevent or greatly delay the emergence of at least some of
these capabilities. This possibility reduces the expected benets of NMD and
should be factored into any full assessment.
Will NMD Work against Emerging WMD Threats?
In this section we briey describe the midcourse NMD system proposed by the
Clinton administration, which is now under development, and examine its ef-
fectiveness against the ICBM threats and countermeasures that might be de-
ployed by emerging missile states. We then consider an alternative NMD
concept—boost-phase defense—that is more likely to be effective. The Bush
administration appears inclined toward a layered system that would combine
boost-phase and multiple midcourse systems. Finally, we consider the value of
limited NMD in light of alternative, non-ICBM methods of delivering WMD.
the proposed nmd system
The U.S. NMD system under development is designed to destroy enemy war-
heads in the midcourse phase, after the ICBM has burned out and released its
warhead but before the warhead reenters the atmosphere. Infrared sensors on
satellites in high earth orbits would detect the hot exhaust plume of the ICBM
soon after it is launched, and track the missile until powered ight ends a few
minutes later. A combination of ground-based radars and infrared sensors on
satellites in low earth orbits would then detect and track objects released by
the missile and attempt to identify which of these is the warhead. Communica-
tions systems would relay this information to a command center, which would
order the launch of ground-based interceptors. Each interceptor would carry a
kill vehicle designed to maneuver directly into the path of the warhead, collid-
ing with it at high speed and destroying it without the aid of explosives; this is
often referred to as “hit-to-kill” intercept. As the kill vehicle approaches the
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warhead, it would use its own onboard infrared sensors and computers to de-
termine which object is the warhead and to home in on it. Ground-based ra-
dars would determine if the warhead had been destroyed and, if not, whether
additional interceptors should be launched.
As envisioned by the Clinton administration, this NMD system was in-
tended to grow in capability, as interceptors, interceptor sites, radars, and sat-
ellites are added to the system. The initial deployment would have 100
interceptors and a special high-resolution phased-array radar in Alaska. The
full system would consist of 250 interceptors deployed at sites in Alaska and
North Dakota; six upgraded radars and nine new radars at sites in the United
States, Greenland, South Korea, and the United Kingdom; and the full comple-
ment of infrared-sensing satellites.
Hit-to-kill intercept is extremely difcult. Even in carefully controlled test
situations, exoatmospheric hit-to-kill intercept has been demonstrated in only
ve of twenty-one attempts.31 Most of the test failures resulted from the mal-
function of a particular component, rather than a fundamental aw in the de-
sign of the system. The poor test record does not mean that reliable hit-to-kill
intercept cannot be demonstrated, but it does indicate its difculty. Independ-
ent ofcial reviews have repeatedly criticized NMD developers for underesti-
mating the difculty of hit-to-kill intercept and their “rush to failure” with
unrealistic test schedules.32
countermeasures and counter-countermeasures
Any country with the will and resources to develop and deploy an ICBM
armed with a nuclear or biological warhead should be expected to take steps to
increase the chance that its missiles would penetrate whatever NMD system
the United States deploys. Unfortunately, the proposed NMD system—and
similar systems, such as the U.S. Navy’s Theater-Wide Defense system, which
some have suggested could be modied for NMD—could be defeated using
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technologies that would be available to any country able to develop a WMD-
armed ICBM.33
For example, biological agents could be delivered by submunitions rather
than by a single warhead. An ICBM could carry 100 or more submunitions,
each weighing a few kilograms. If the submunitions were released soon after
the ICBM burns out, a limited NMD would be overwhelmed by a large num-
ber of equally deadly targets. In fact, submunitions are the preferred method of
delivering biological agents, because they permit more efcient dispersal of
the agent. Any country able to solve the challenges associated with building an
ICBM, a reentry vehicle, and a unitary biological warhead would surely be
able to deploy effective biological submunitions.34
For missiles armed with a nuclear warhead, an attacker could deploy decoys
to overwhelm U.S. NMD. Decoys take advantage of the fact that all objects
with the same initial velocity travel along identical paths in the vacuum of
space, regardless of their mass. With the proposed NMD system, the kill vehi-
cle would attempt to distinguish between simple balloon decoys and war-
heads on the basis of their infrared signatures. Tests done so far leave serious
doubts about whether the system will be able to reliably distinguish warheads
from balloons.35
Even if the NMD system achieves this ability, an attacker could prevent the
defense from identifying the warhead by enclosing it in a balloon so that it re-
sembles one of the decoys—a technique known as “antisimulation.” The NMD
would observe many balloons, all with nearly identical radar and infrared sig-
natures. A study by scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
the Union of Concerned Scientists showed that the observable differences be-
tween an empty balloon and a balloon with a warhead inside are so small that
the NMD system would be unable to identify which balloon contains the war-
head.36 As with submunitions, any country that is able to develop an ICBM
and a nuclear warhead should be able to deploy antisimulation balloons.37
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Although the proposed NMD system would be ineffective against counter-
measures, the United States might be able to modify the system to increase its
effectiveness. One possibility is to use nuclear-armed interceptors.38 Nuclear
weapons can destroy objects over a large volume of space, so it might be imag-
ined that a single nuclear-armed interceptor would be able to destroy all of the
submunitions or decoys released by a missile. An attacker could, however,
spread out the submunitions or balloons, thereby requiring the defender to use
dozens of large nuclear explosions to defend against a small attack, raising
concerns about fratricide and damage to NMD sensors and civilian satellites.39
The use of nuclear interceptors also would generate greater domestic and in-
ternational opposition to NMD. Given these difculties, the prospects for nu-
clear-armed interceptors do not appear promising.
Other approaches have been suggested to defeat the countermeasures
described above, including employing ground- and spaced-based lasers to
discriminate between decoys and warheads;40 using much more extensive de-
ployments of radars and space-based sensors to observe with high resolution
the initial deployment of warheads and decoys; and miniaturizing sensors,
computers, and thrusters so that dozens of kill vehicles could be carried by a
single interceptor.41 Although these advanced concepts might make midcourse
NMD effective against antisimulation decoys, they go far beyond the bound-
aries of the currently planned system. The United States should not proceed
with deployment of the planned NMD system in the hope that advanced con-
cepts might in the future render the system effective.
boost-phase nmd
Intercepting ballistic missiles during the powered phase of their trajectory of-
fers several important advantages over midcourse intercept. First, boost-phase
International Security 26:1 52
Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, An-
drew M. Sessler, and David C. Wright, “Response to Uzi Rubin’s ‘Comments on the UCS Report on
Countermeasures,’” September 1, 2000, http://www.ucsusa.org/security/response.html, defends
the initial UCS/MIT position.
38. Edward O. Rios, “A Credible National Missile Defense: Do-Able NMD,” Breakthroughs, Vol. 8,
No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 9–18.
39. Even a single nuclear explosion in space could inict extensive damage on civilian satellites ,
resulting in losses of tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars. John Parmentola, “High-altitude
Nuclear Detonations against Low-earth Orbit Satellites,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Wash-
ington, D.C., unpublished presentation, April 2000. Fratricide refers to the possibility that the ex-
plosion of one nuclear interceptor might render inoperable the nuclear warheads of nearby
interceptors.
40. See, for example, “Report to the American Physical Society of the Study Group on Science and
Technology of Directed Energy Weapons,” Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 59, No. 2, Part 2 (July
1987), pp. S154–S168.
41. J. Bard, “Multiple Miniature ABM Warheads,” unpublished manuscript, 2000.
intercept destroys the entire missile payload—submunitions, decoys, and war-
heads (or causes the payload to fall thousands of kilometers short of the in-
tended target, resulting in little or no damage). Second, a burning missile
booster is much brighter, larger, slower-moving, and more fragile than a war-
head, and is therefore much easier to detect, track, and destroy. Third, a boost-
phase defense would be able to cover a much larger area than a midcourse de-
fense; a system that could defend the United States might also be able to de-
fend U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.
The main disadvantage of boost-phase defense is that the system must
be positioned near the enemy launch site when the launch occurs. The most
straightforward solution is to base boost-phase interceptors close to missile
launch sites, either in neighboring countries or on ships patrolling nearby.42
The interceptors would be launched about a minute after the ICBM launch
is detected by early warning satellites. After the interceptor rises above the
atmosphere, onboard sensors would detect the bright missile plume and guide
the kill vehicle to a collision with the ICBM. Although not yet developed,
this type of system is technologically less demanding and probably could
be available sooner and at lower cost than the proposed midcourse NMD
system.
Because surface-based boost-phase interceptors must be based within sev-
eral hundred kilometers of potential launch sites, favorable geography is es-
sential. This requirement would not pose a problem for defending against
North Korea or Iraq. Interceptors based on ships or barges in the Sea of Japan
(or on the ground near Vladivostok) could destroy missiles launched toward
the United States or Europe from anywhere in North Korea; interceptors based
in southeastern Turkey could destroy missiles launched from Iraq. Iran is
much larger and more difcult to defend against; interceptors would have to
be based in the Caspian Sea region and perhaps also in the Persian Gulf or the
Gulf of Oman.
At the same time, the geographical constraints of surface-based boost-phase
systems provide important advantages. Surface-based boost-phase systems
deployed against rogue states would not be within range of ICBMs launched
from deep inside Russia and China, making it easier to reassure Moscow and
Beijing that U.S. NMD is not directed against them. In addition, the fact that
Russia could provide bases for a boost-phase defense against North Korea,
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Iran, and Iraq, and that it could share in the protection afforded by the system,
creates the possibility for close cooperation with Russia on NMD.
A variety of other boost-phase concepts have generated interest, including
interceptors or lasers based in space or on aircraft.43 Although these systems
deserve continued consideration, at this time they appear less attractive, given
the high economic costs of deploying an effective system, severe technological
challenges, the threat they could pose to Russia and China, or a combination of
all three.
alternative means of delivering wmd
Opponents argue that NMD lacks value because rogue states do not need
ICBMs to attack the United States with WMD. If faced with an effective U.S.
NMD, rogues could turn to short-range ballistic or cruise missiles launched
from surface ships operating in international waters off the U.S. coast, or they
could smuggle weapons into the United States by land, sea, or air. We believe
that effective NMD would retain some value nevertheless, because ICBMs pos-
sess military-operational characteristics and political uses not easily provided
by other means of delivery.
Alternative means of delivery generally are far less expensive and techni-
cally challenging to develop and deploy than is an ICBM. It is much easier to
develop or purchase a short-range ballistic or cruise missile and to modify
it for launch off a ship than to develop or purchase an ICBM of equal pay-
load, and the technical challenges associated with smuggling are trivial in
comparison.
Moreover, alternative means of delivery could be at least as effective as
ICBMs in delivering WMD to U.S. territory, particularly if the weapons were
forward deployed before the start of hostilities. Legitimate commercial trafc
across or near U.S. borders is immense, making it difcult, if not impossible, to
identify a missile-bearing ship or to intercept a smuggled weapon. The United
States has almost no ability to intercept ballistic or cruise missiles launched
within a few hundred kilometers of its coastline, and an effective defense
against these threats would be at least as costly and technically challenging as
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NMD.44 Based on U.S. experience with drug interdiction, a well-planned oper-
ation to smuggle WMD into the United States would have at least a 90 percent
probability of success—much higher than ICBM delivery even in the absence
of NMD.
Alternative means of delivery could have other important advantages:
Weapons could be delivered with higher accuracy than would be possible with
a rst-generation ICBM; smuggled nuclear weapons would not have to meet
the stringent size and mass requirements imposed by missile delivery; biologi-
cal agents could be distributed with much higher efciency using low-ying
cruise missiles or smuggled aerosol generators; and, unlike ICBMs, which
carry an unmistakable return address, the United States might be unable to de-
termine the identity of an attacker.
Although alternative means of delivery are cheap and potentially quite ef-
fective, their military-operational characteristics are very different from those
of ICBMs. Intercontinental missiles reside on national territory, under the rm
control of political and military leaders, until the moment of use. To be effec-
tive, ship-based missiles or smuggled WMD would have to be forward de-
ployed. Rogue-state leaders might be extremely reluctant to relax their control
over such valuable and destructive weapons. They would require loyal agents
who could be relied on to use forward-deployed weapons if, and only if, or-
dered to do so.
A rogue state also would have to consider the possibility that forward-de-
ployed WMD would be discovered during long periods of predeployment. A
missile-bearing ship just off the U.S. coast or a nuclear or biological weapon
smuggled into a U.S. port would be interpreted as a more direct and immedi-
ate threat to the United States than an ICBM. The United States would respond
with strong sanctions, perhaps extending to military blockade and efforts to
destabilize the rogue-state government. Moreover, a rogue state that manages
to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to have a very limited stockpile—perhaps
only one or two weapons—which would make it reluctant to forward deploy
them simply because losing even one weapon would signicantly reduce its
capability to inict damage.
A rogue country might therefore wait until hostilities began to forward de-
ploy its WMD. But if war broke out, the United States would be able to inter-
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cept or destroy any ships or aircraft leaving the rogue country. In addition, the
United States would activate its counterterrorism programs, increasing sur-
veillance of ships near U.S. coasts and making it more difcult to smuggle a
weapon into the United States. Although difcult to quantify, the risks are
sufciently high that it seems unlikely that a rogue country would choose to
place primary reliance on its ability to forward deploy WMD once a crisis or
war had started.
A key question then is whether a window of opportunity might exist for a
rogue country intent on smuggling WMD into the United States—a period
when conict appears likely but before the United States would take measures
to prevent suspicious shipments out of the rogue state or into the United
States. This would depend largely on the nature of the conict. If the rogue
state plans a “bolt-from-the-blue” attack, it could deploy WMD a month or
two before the attack. In other cases, conict might erupt before the rogue state
had an opportunity to act.
In addition to these military-operational differences, there are important po-
litical differences between ICBMs and alternative means of delivery. ICBMs are
visible symbols of a country’s military power. Their main purpose, in the eyes
of a rogue-state leader, may be to acquire prestige, or to deter or coerce great
powers. In contrast, forward-based weapons must remain invisible and unde-
tectable to be effective, which limits their deterrent or coercive effect.45
In summary, alternative means of delivering WMD would be most attractive
to rogue states willing to accept the substantial risks inherent in forward-
basing and more concerned with being able to inict damage on the United
States than with using WMD as a deterrent, or to states that are planning a
bolt-from-the-blue attack. Such states are likely to be rare. ICBMs should be
more attractive to states that value the symbolic and deterrent effect of missiles
and that wish to retain tight control over such weapons. The states of greatest
concern today—North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—are most likely to fall into the
latter category, and therefore should prefer ICBMs over alternative methods of
delivery.46 Although states of this type should be deterred from using WMD by
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the threat of U.S. retaliation, failures of deterrence cannot be ruled out, and a
possible role therefore remains for limited NMD.
The Strategic Logic of NMD: Rogues versus Major Powers
Opponents have argued that NMD promises to generate arms races with Rus-
sia and China, threatens the foundation of arms control between the United
States and Russia by requiring amendments to the ABM treaty, and reects a
shift in American policy away from deterrence. In theory at least, these claims
are substantially overstated.
stable nuclear relations and limited nmd
A U.S. NMD system capable of defending against a small missile force need
not pose a threat to a large missile force. As noted above, some types of limited
NMD systems, such as a surface-based boost-phase system, could be highly ef-
fective against rogue states and yet have no capability against Russia or China.
But even if the defense is able to intercept Russian missiles, as long as the num-
ber of U.S. defense interceptors is much smaller than the number of survivable
warheads deployed by Russia, Moscow can be condent in its ability to over-
whelm the NMD.47 Therefore, in a world in which rogues have on the order of
ten missiles and Russia has 1,000 or more warheads, there are at least in theory
defenses that would be highly effective against the small rogue forces and en-
tirely ineffective against the large Russian force. Consequently, U.S. deploy-
ment of limited NMD need not threaten Russia’s ability to preserve a large
retaliatory nuclear deterrent,48 or China’s ability to establish and maintain such
a deterrent.
More specically, amending the ABM treaty to allow the system that the
Clinton administration proposed—whether 100 interceptors and a large radar
in Alaska, or as many as 250 interceptors at two sites—need not undermine
arms control between the United States and Russia. The key objective of the
ABM treaty was to give both the United States and the Soviet Union
condence that neither country could protect itself from an all-out nuclear re-
taliatory attack. If Russia maintains 2,500 warheads, as the Clinton admin-
istration envisioned for the third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III)
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or even the 1,500 that Russia prefers, 100 to 250 U.S. defense interceptors
need not undermine Russian condence in its retaliatory capabilities. This
said, limited NMD could pose a threat to current Russian forces because they
are highly vulnerable to U.S. attack. This is a problem that is worth solving
whether or not the United States deploys NMD. We discuss this issue in a later
section.
China’s situation is different from Russia’s, because it has only a small inter-
continental nuclear force. China would likely decide that it needs to increase
the size of its nuclear force in response to U.S. NMD. Nevertheless a stable
equilibrium should be possible. China has not maintained a nuclear force that
is adequate when judged by even the least demanding U.S. standards. To the
extent that China desires a more adequate deterrent capability, it will need to
modernize and increase the size and survivability of its force, which it appears
likely to do even if the United States does not deploy NMD.49 U.S. NMD
would require a further expansion of the Chinese force, perhaps signicantly
beyond its current plans. In terms of military capabilities, what distinguishes
China from emerging missile states is its much greater economic power and its
more advanced technological base. Although starting from a small force,
China’s prospects for building a nuclear force that can condently overwhelm
U.S. NMD are much greater than for states that are projected to be able to build
only a small intercontinental force.
Assessing whether major powers will be able to maintain condence in their
retaliatory capabilities becomes more complicated when we shift from consid-
ering static forces to the possibility of an arms race in which one side quickly
expands its NMD, forcing others to react to preserve their deterrent capabili-
ties. If limited NMD requires infrastructure—large radars or expensive satellite
systems—that could support a much larger system, and if the time required to
build, test, and integrate the system is much greater than the time required to
add more interceptors, then a limited system would give the United States a
running start on a larger system. For exactly this reason, an important feature
of the ABM treaty is the limitations it imposes on radars.50 Even these dynamic
considerations, however, are unlikely to make stable strategic relationships in-
feasible. The possibility of NMD expansion could be offset by allowing oppos-
ing states to maintain larger deployed nuclear forces or an ability to expand
their offensive forces at roughly the same rate as the defense.
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Although stable strategic relationships should be possible, it is true that
concern about rapid expansion of U.S. NMD would be likely to further dimin-
ish Russia’s willingness to reduce its nuclear forces and increase China’s esti-
mates of the necessary expansion of its nuclear force. These are costs that must
be considered in an overall assessment.
Of course, both Russia and China would prefer a world in which the United
States did not deploy NMD. But this is quite different from concluding that
these countries cannot meet their basic nuclear deterrent requirements if the
United States deploys limited NMD or that military relations must then turn
highly competitive. The challenge will be less nding force postures that meet
countries’ strategic requirements, and more managing the politics of transition
to these arrangements. We turn to these issues in later sections.
comparison to cold war strategic arguments
Before completing our discussion of basic strategic arguments, it is useful to
consider briey the Cold War case against NMD. Three powerful arguments
undermined the case for a defense of the U.S. homeland against Soviet nuclear
forces. When we shift our focus to small powers, however, these arguments no
longer generate a strong case against NMD.
cost-exchange ratios and the infeasibility of effective nmd. The
strongest Cold War argument against NMD was that even if the United States
could build a missile defense that would work against deployed Soviet forces,
the Soviets could defeat the U.S. NMD at a cost much smaller than the cost to
the United States of building the defense in the rst place. In other words, the
cost-exchange ratio signicantly favored the offensive forces and the preserva-
tion of retaliatory capabilities.51 The result of deploying NMD would be an
arms race that left U.S. vulnerability undiminished, while greatly increasing
the cost of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.
This argument assumed that the Soviet Union had the resources to react to
U.S. deployments and therefore that the cost-exchange ratio would largely de-
termine the outcome of the arms competition.52 In contrast, the cost-exchange
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ratio has less inuence on the outcome of an arms race between the United
States and a small state, because the United States can outspend small coun-
tries by an order of magnitude or more if necessary. Whether the United States
should make this investment depends on the probability of being attacked, the
value of what is being protected, the effectiveness of the defense, and the op-
portunity costs of alternative uses of the resources, not on whether it has to
outspend a small state.
preemptive incentives and crisis instability. A common Cold War con-
cern was that if NMD became effective enough to provide some homeland pro-
tection, then it could reduce crisis stability by creating incentives for a country
to launch a counterforce rst strike and then rely on its NMD to limit damage
from a retaliatory strike. This danger of crisis instability resulting from a recip-
rocal fear of preemptive attack would occur only if both countries had rst-
strike incentives. This type of crisis instability would not be a problem for the
United States facing small nuclear states, because the forces of small states will
have essentially no capability against U.S. nuclear forces.
A state with a small arsenal might face pressure to attack during a crisis, but
this pressure is of a different type and is largely unaffected by NMD. A state
with a highly vulnerable force could feel pressure to attack early in a crisis, but
only if it valued inicting damage on the United States for its own sake, rather
than as part of a continuing deterrent policy or a damage limitation policy.
This incentive to inict damage would be smaller than that generated by the
reciprocal fear of rst strikes because the state would not be attacking to pro-
tect itself and because the United States would retain an undiminished capabil-
ity to inict virtually unlimited retaliatory damage. NMD is unlikely to
signicantly increase this type of crisis pressure. Rogue country ICBM forces
are likely to be small and highly vulnerable to U.S. attack; a rogue state that
valued inicting damage on the United States would see advantages to attack-
ing early in a crisis even if the United States did not deploy NMD. Fortunately,
states that want to inict damage for its own sake are likely to be extremely
rare.
arms races and political spirals. According to the cost-exchange argu-
ment, NMD would have resulted in the United States and the Soviet Union
spending tremendous resources without reducing their vulnerability to attack.
A further argument held that this arms race also would have been dangerous,
damaging relations by convincing the superpowers that their adversary har-
bored malign motives. While each country would understand its NMD as an
effort to increase its security by reducing the costs of a nuclear war, it could
reasonably worry that its adversary’s NMD reected a desire for nuclear ad-
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vantages that would enhance its ability to challenge the status quo.53 In this
case, NMD would generate not only a wasteful arms race but also negative po-
litical spirals that increased the probability of war by intensifying each coun-
tries’ fear of the other.
This argument applies much less strongly to rogue states. They probably are
not motivated by insecurity vis-à-vis the United States; even if they are, exist-
ing U.S. military advantages are more than sufcient to create this insecurity,
and NMD would not do much to increase it. Moreover, U.S. relations with
rogue states have been sufciently bad that making relations worse would be
less important, although this might be changing for North Korea and Iran.
deterrence then and now. Finally, does U.S. interest in NMD indicate a
fundamental shift from reliance on deterrence? In reality, the United States
never preferred deterrence over defense. During the Cold War, the dominant
argument against NMD was that it would not work;54 the ABM treaty reected
the infeasibility of defending the U.S. homeland against Soviet nuclear attack.
Moreover, the political and military dangers that opponents identied during
the Cold War—including strategic windows and political spirals—would not
be generated by NMD directed against rogue states. NMD against rogues
would not reect a fundamental shift in U.S. strategy.
This section provided a brief review of strategic nuclear logic, but did not
address whether the United States should deploy limited NMD; answering
that question requires a net assessment of limited NMD’s costs and benets.
Before turning to this analysis, we address the question of whether the United
States should pursue more ambitious NMD directed at Russia, China, or both.
NMD against Deliberate Russian or Chinese Attacks?
The most basic decision facing the United States is whether it should try to de-
fend against deliberate attacks by Russia or China. Although defending against
major powers is rarely offered as the reason for pursuing NMD, some propo-
nents favor it primarily for this purpose,55 and see limited NMD as a foot in the
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door to more ambitious deployments. Other proponents favor NMD primarily
for protecting against rogues, but envision conditions under which the United
States should also deploy NMD against China. For example, shortly before be-
coming deputy national security adviser, Stephen Hadley argued that “the
United States should have no need to deploy an NMD system against China.
But if China continues to insist that it is free to use force against Taiwan, con-
tinues to deploy more ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan and the United States,
and continues to threaten to use those missiles against both, then the United
States may simply have no choice.”56
For two broad reasons—technical infeasibility and political provocation—
the United States should not pursue these more ambitious missile defenses. In
fact, the major challenge facing the United States would be to avoid provoking
Russia and China while pursuing effective NMD against rogue states.
technical infeasibility
For at least three reasons, Russia and China have much greater prospects for
defeating U.S. NMD than do rogue states. First, both have the resources to
build offensive forces that would overwhelm U.S. NMD. The United States can
outspend emerging missile states by a factor of ten or more, but it cannot do so
against Russia or China. Moreover, the cost-exchange ratio will be less favor-
able to NMD in major power competitions than in competitions against rogue
states. To limit damage to a given level against a large force, the United States
must deploy an NMD system capable of intercepting a larger percentage of in-
coming warheads than would be required against a smaller force, which drives
up the cost-exchange ratio.57
Given current Russian economic weakness, this resource-based argument is
probably less strong for Russia than it is for China. A number of considerations
suggest, however, that Russia will be able to respond effectively. Russia is
starting with a large nuclear force, and its nuclear infrastructure, experience
with diverse basing modes, and large stockpiles of warheads and ssile mate-
rials would give it a running start in efforts to offset U.S. NMD. Specic re-
sponses could include deploying larger numbers of mobile ICBMs and
equipping its mobile and xed ICBMs with multiple warheads. In addition,
Russia could increase the alert level of its forces, thereby improving their sur-
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vivability and ability to overwhelm U.S. NMD in retaliation. Furthermore, in a
couple of decades Russia may well be much stronger economically and have
restructured its military in ways that free up substantial resources for nuclear
forces. This is the relevant time frame because even in the unlikely event that
optimistic assessments of NMD technology prove to be correct, deployed am-
bitious NMD systems are at least a couple of decades away.
Second, Russia and China have more advanced technology bases, which will
enable them to deploy types of countermeasures that would be unavailable to
emerging missile states. These would include fast-burn boosters, maneuvering
reentry vehicles, sophisticated decoys and electronic countermeasures, salvage
fusing of nuclear warheads or precursor nuclear explosions, and antisatellite
weapons. Even if the United States can eventually solve the problems posed by
simple countermeasures, and thereby gain some capability against emerging
missile states, it would likely still be unable to deploy an NMD that is effective
against these Russian and Chinese reactions.
Third, major powers will be able to deploy traditional alternative means of
delivery—such as bombers, submarines, or ships armed with long-range
cruise missiles—against which the United States would be unable to protect it-
self with NMD or other strategic defenses. Although rogue states may have
nontraditional alternative means of delivery, they are likely to prefer missiles
for the reasons given above, which increases somewhat U.S. prospects for de-
fending against their WMD attacks.
political provocation
If the only result of U.S. NMD was that the United States and its competitors
wasted resources, then this issue would be less critical for national security
policy. However, dedicated U.S. efforts to reduce Russian and Chinese retalia-
tory capabilities and gain meaningful nuclear superiority would damage U.S.
relations with these countries.
reducing russian and chinese security. Although it is not easy to con-
jure up scenarios in which nuclear weapons would play a central role in meet-
ing Russian and Chinese security requirements, potential conicts are not
sufciently small or unthinkable that nuclear capabilities do not matter. At a
minimum, they are an essential element of the background conditions that will
inuence a state’s options and bargaining positions in future scenarios. In re-
sponse to growing conventional weakness, Russian doctrine now calls for rely-
ing more heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence of conventional conict.
In the case of China, the scenarios are less abstract, as strategic nuclear forces
could play a role in a conict over Taiwan. Although China apparently sees
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theater missile defenses (TMD) as more threatening than NMD, Chinese strate-
gic nuclear capabilities, and therefore U.S. NMD, would inuence its assess-
ment of the regional environment.58
More generally, nuclear retaliatory capabilities remain a basic requirement of
major power security. To put things in perspective, the United States continues
to believe that its security requires nuclear forces on the order of 2,000 de-
ployed strategic warheads, which provide, in addition to very large
countervalue retaliatory capabilities, a wide range of counterforce options.59
China appears to be moving from a less demanding doctrine, which required
only a small retaliatory capability, to one requiring larger survivable forces and
more exible employment options.60
U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority would fuel insecurity whether or not its
NMD was effective. If NMD was effective, Russia and China would believe
that they were vulnerable to U.S. coercion. If, as seems far more likely, NMD
was ineffective, Russian and Chinese leaders would interpret dedicated U.S.
efforts to achieve effective NMD as a signal of malign U.S. motives. Because
they undoubtedly believe that nuclear deterrence is adequate to preserve U.S.
security, they would interpret U.S. efforts to acquire nuclear superiority as in-
dicative of expansionist motives. This is particularly likely given U.S. global
conventional superiority and the absence of intense conicts that threaten U.S.
security. Competitive U.S. policies would lend support to hard-liners and na-
tionalists who are competing for inuence in Russia and in China, and their in-
creased inuence would reinforce the signal sent by highly competitive U.S.
nuclear policies.
why bad relations are bad. Even though the United States is the domi-
nant global military power, it should nevertheless strongly prefer a world in
which all of the major powers are secure. Insecurity can fuel expansionist be-
havior,61 encouraging, for example, Russia to try to exert greater control over
former Soviet republics. Although this probably would not lead to a clash be-
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tween Russia and NATO, it would exacerbate tensions and once again increase
the salience of military considerations in this relationship. China might see
NMD as creating a window during which it still had the capability to prevent
Taiwan’s drift toward independence, and Chinese incentives would be in-
creased by NMD’s signal of malign U.S. intentions.
Increased insecurity would fuel arms competition and a breakdown of coop-
eration, which could further strain relations and create military dangers. China
will increasingly have the capability to build up its conventional and nuclear
forces, which could convince Japan that it needs to rely more heavily on its
own military capabilities. This arms race in Northeast Asia could generate sub-
stantial tensions within the region and, as a result, reduce U.S. security. Al-
though Russia is now too weak economically to engage in a major buildup,
this is unlikely always to be true. In any case, the United States has important
cooperative programs with Russia, designed to improve Russian control over
its nuclear weapons and weapon materials, that could be interrupted or termi-
nated if the United States pursued NMD.
Although none of these reactions is certain to occur, full-scale NMD would
certainly increase their probability. Russia will view NMD in terms of overall
U.S. policy, which has included NATO expansion and military intervention in
European conicts in the face of Russian opposition. China is likely to view
NMD as part of a package in which Washington steps up its support for Tai-
wan, deploys TMD in the region, and calls for increases in Japanese military
spending and operational capability.62
The key counterargument to the above analysis is that the deterrent and
damage-limitation benets of a highly effective NMD would more than offset
the dangers that would ow from increased Russian and Chinese insecurity.
We believe that under current conditions this case for nuclear superiority is
awed.63 Given that U.S. relations with Russia and China are in formative
transition stages and that cooperative policies might help advance and cement
peaceful relations, our judgment is that forgoing large-scale NMD seems pref-
erable to risking what at best would be a new Cold War. This conclusion is re-
inforced by the near certainty that U.S. efforts to achieve effective NMD
against Russia and China would fail, in which case the United States would get
all the costs but none of the benets of full-scale NMD.
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The Military/Strategic Benets and Costs of Effective Limited NMD
In this section, we assume for the sake of analysis that limited NMD would
have some capability against rogue-state missile forces and explore its benets
in deterring and protecting against rogue-state attacks and against accidental
Russian missile launches.64
the probability that a rogue state would attack
In assessing the benets of NMD, we must consider the probability of a rogue-
state attack and the effect that NMD would have on this probability. The lower
the probability of attack in the absence of NMD, the smaller the benets of
NMD because it is less likely to be called on to protect the United States. The
value of NMD would be greater, however, if its deployment enhanced U.S. de-
terrence and thereby reduced the likelihood of rogue attacks.
The probability of a rogue-state attack in the absence of NMD is very low.
We explained above that the number of rogue states that might acquire ICBMs
over the next ten to fteen years is small, and diplomacy may enable the
United States to prevent some of these threats from materializing. Here we ar-
gue that the United States most likely will be able to deter any rogue ICBM
threats that do emerge.
For the foreseeable future, the credibility of U.S. retaliatory threats should be
high, and therefore the probability of a rogue attack should be extremely low.
Rogue states will lack mobile ICBMs, leaving deployed missiles and launch fa-
cilities vulnerable to U.S. conventional and nuclear attack. Because the United
States would not be vulnerable to further attacks, and because it would have
an undiminished capability to inict virtually unlimited damage, the credibil-
ity of its retaliatory threats should be very high. In addition, the United States
would be responding to the use of nuclear or biological weapons that had
inicted grave damage to its homeland, which would remove the most severe
moral barriers to the use of nuclear weapons to inict punishment and prevent
further attacks, thereby bolstering its credibility even more.
U.S. credibility would be lower in the unlikely case of a rogue state that pos-
sessed some survivable deliverable WMD. In this case, even though the U.S.
ability to inict damage would greatly exceed the rogue’s, the United States
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might be deterred from retaliation by the prospect of further rogue attacks. The
balance of interests might well favor the rogue state, because its attack proba-
bly would be prompted by U.S. involvement in a regional conict in which the
rogue’s interests were probably greater than those of the United States. For ex-
ample, North Korea might attack the United States to coerce its withdrawal
from a war on the Korean Peninsula in the belief that the United States would
not retaliate because the risks of additional North Korean nuclear attacks ex-
ceeded the benets of protecting U.S. regional interests. This is the bargaining
logic of limited nuclear options that was studied during the Cold War, but now
with a large asymmetry of capabilities.65 The rogue state would be running the
risk of complete annihilation, but the bet would not necessarily be irrational.
Rogues seeking to deter America’s deterrent may be more likely to turn to
theater missiles, which are small and can be highly survivable when mounted
on mobile launchers, as Iraq demonstrated during the Gulf War. A survivable
theater missile capability would allow a rogue state to hold U.S. regional allies
hostage, threatening to attack them if the United States retaliates. For example,
North Korea could threaten to attack South Korea or Japan, and Iraq could
threaten to attack Israel or southern Europe, if the United States retaliates. Al-
though less effective in deterring a U.S. response than direct threats against the
U.S. homeland, holding close U.S. regional allies hostage could reduce the
credibility of U.S. retaliation.
Would NMD enhance deterrence? If a rogue state had a survivable ICBM ca-
pability, NMD might decrease the probability of a rogue attack by reducing
U.S. vulnerability and thereby enhancing U.S. credibility. In this role, NMD
need not be perfect; simply reducing U.S. vulnerability might be valuable. Per-
haps more important, if NMD deployment caused rogue states to think that
the United States believed it was invulnerable to missile attack, then deter-
rence of a rogue attack would be enhanced. Rogue states are extremely un-
likely to have survivable ICBMs, however. NMD would have virtually no
ability to bolster deterrence of a rogue possessing only a vulnerable ICBM
force, because it should already be effectively deterred.66
The preceding arguments show that if rogue leaders are rational, weighing
the risks and benets of attacking the United States and making decisions per-
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ceived to be in their own best interests, then the probability of a rogue ICBM
attack should be very low, and U.S. NMD would have little if any effect on
this probability. But what about irrational leaders and unauthorized attacks?
If losing a war that promised to end its regime, a doomed rogue leadership
might attack believing that it had nothing to lose. The possibility also exists
that a rogue leader would delegate launch authority to military commanders
who might attack the United States because they believed it was preparing
to destroy their forces. Although the probability of these attacks is extremely
hard to estimate, given the stakes they are probably unlikely even relative
to the scenarios discussed above. Nevertheless, their possibility increases
somewhat the probability of a rogue attack and therefore the value of limited
NMD.
damage limitation against small arsenals
Because the United States cannot be certain that a rogue state will not attack,
NMD could have some value for limiting damage. During the Cold War, NMD
would have had to have been extremely effective to signicantly reduce the
damage the United States would suffer in an all-out war, because the Soviet
Union could have attacked with thousands of warheads. In contrast, when fac-
ing a small arsenal, destroying even one or two warheads could signicantly
reduce the damage suffered by the United States. Highly effective NMD is
preferable, of course, but even a moderately effective NMD could be valuable
for limiting damage against a small attack.
The requirements for damage limitation obviously inuence the technical
feasibility of NMD. If missile defense needs to intercept only a moderate frac-
tion of incoming warheads to be valuable, then the demands on the technology
are much lower than if the NMD must be nearly perfect. Although hit-to-kill
technology is not yet up to even this more modest task, the threshold it must
get over is much lower.
The United States can also limit damage by destroying rogue ICBMs before
they are launched. If the United States could count on preemptively destroying
the entire rogue-state force, NMD would be unnecessary. The United States
might not have the opportunity to preempt a rogue attack, however. In this
case, the United States probably could destroy whatever ICBMs the rogue state
did not use in its initial attack, or at least its ability to launch these missiles.
The challenge facing U.S. NMD would then be smaller than suggested by the
total number of ICBMs, and NMD’s prospects for contributing to damage limi-
tation would be correspondingly greater.
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protection of the u.s. ability to pursue its regional interests
A major concern generated by the spread of weapons of mass destruction to
rogue states, and particularly by the proliferation of ICBMs, is that these capa-
bilities will reduce U.S. willingness to pursue its foreign policy interests. For
example, North Korean capabilities to attack the United States might decrease
U.S. willingness to meet its commitment to South Korea in the event of an at-
tack by the North. Part of the problem, especially in the post-Soviet era, is that
the U.S. interests in question are not truly vital, making it hard to justify pursu-
ing foreign policies that increase the probability of attacks with weapons of
mass destruction against U.S. cities. Some proponents see NMD as a solution
to this problem.67
Limited NMD would be of little value in protecting U.S. foreign policy, how-
ever. Unless U.S. leaders believed that the NMD system was almost perfectly
effective, it would not signicantly reduce their reluctance to pursue policies
that risked escalation to nuclear attacks. The United States would lack
condence in the effectiveness of its NMD, if only because it would not have
been tested against the rogue threat or under fully realistic conditions. In addi-
tion, NMD would offer no protection against alternative modes of delivering
WMD. Given this continuing concern about U.S. vulnerability, combined with
the limited nature of U.S. interests, NMD would be unlikely to increase
signicantly the United States’ freedom of action in a regional conict. More-
over, if U.S. leaders were mistakenly condent in the effectiveness of NMD
and therefore underestimated U.S. vulnerability, NMD would decrease U.S.
security by encouraging the United States to pursue an overly risky foreign
policy.68
protection against russian accidental launches
The Soviet coup attempt in 1991, followed by the breakup of the Soviet Union
and the fragmentation of its nuclear arsenal among four new states, focused
U.S. attention on the risk of an accidental missile launch. The limited NMD
proposals of the early 1990s—the Bush administration’s Global Protection
against Limited Strikes system and the more modest Accidental Launch Pro-
tection System advanced by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia)—were framed
National Missile Defense 69
67. See, for example, Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Why the Best Offense Is a Good Missile Defense,” New
Republic, March 12, 2001, pp. 20–25.
68. George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, “National Missile Defense: An Indefensi-
ble System,” Foreign Policy, No. 117 (Winter 1999–2000), p. 128.
largely in these terms. Although the focus of limited NMD has shifted to coun-
tering the threat of deliberate attack by an emerging missile state, the Missile
Defense Act of 1999 made defense against accidental and unauthorized
launches a goal of U.S. policy.
The term “accidental launch” refers to a variety of possible events. A truly
unintentional launch—a mechanical or electronic failure, software bug, or op-
erator error that results in the automatic launch of missiles without authoriza-
tion from political leaders or deliberate action by military ofcers—is
considered extremely unlikely. More troubling is the possibility that such fail-
ures or errors might cause leaders to mistakenly authorize an attack. For exam-
ple, failures in Russia’s attack warning systems might cause leaders to order a
missile strike in the mistaken belief that Russia was under attack. Also worri-
some is the possibility of a launch of missiles by a person or group acting with-
out authorization from the political leadership. Although Russia has control
systems and procedures to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons,
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reportedly believes that these safeguards
can be circumvented.69
The risks of erroneous or unauthorized launch are difcult to assess. The
U.S. intelligence community judges that “an unauthorized or accidental launch
of a Russian strategic missile is highly unlikely so long as current technical and
procedural safeguards are in place,”70 but this may not always be the case. The
collapse of Russia’s economy and the concurrent decline in defense spending
have led to a general deterioration in its nuclear forces and in the competence
and morale of Russian military personnel.71 Of particular concern are reports
that Russia maintains an option to launch its missiles on warning of an attack
on its territory, despite serious degradation in its attack warning systems. In
1995, the detection by Russian radar of the launch of a Norwegian scientic
rocket generated a warning of possible attack serious enough to trigger the
rst-ever activation of President Boris Yeltsin’s “nuclear briefcase.” Russian
ofcials were able to detect the error in time, but Russia’s warning network has
continued to deteriorate.72 Given the low survivability of Russia’s nuclear
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forces and command and control systems, Russian military leaders might be
predisposed to launch a strike rather than wait to nd out if the alarm was
false, especially if the warning occurs during an international crisis.
The argument that limited NMD would reduce the risk of an erroneous or
unauthorized Russian attack is deeply awed. First, the size of such an attack
could greatly exceed the capacity of a limited NMD system. If Russian leaders
mistakenly believed their country was under attack, it seems far more likely
that they would order a massive counterstrike involving thousands of war-
heads rather than a small attack. Unauthorized attacks also could be large: A
single submarine carries 16 to 20 missiles armed with 48 to 200 warheads, and
it is likely that anyone who somehow gains the ability to launch a single ICBM
could just as easily launch dozens of missiles armed with hundreds of war-
heads.73 Although there might be accidental Russian attacks that would not
overwhelm limited U.S. NMD, most of them probably would.
Second, Russia would respond to the deployment of limited NMD74 by
equipping its missiles with sophisticated countermeasures.75 This would be
likely to happen even if the United States was able to reassure Russia that its
NMD system was oriented toward emerging missile states. Russia would view
countermeasures as a necessary hedge against worst-case assessments of
NMD’s effectiveness and against breakout from constraints on the number of
interceptors. Russia would probably also see countermeasures as necessary to
preserve an effective option to launch a limited nuclear strike. Limited NMD is
therefore unlikely to be effective against even a small erroneous or unautho-
rized Russian attack.
Third, and most important, Russia would likely respond to the deployment
of U.S. NMD in ways that would increase the probability of an erroneous or
unauthorized attack. If Russia believed that NMD heightened its vulnerability
to attack, it could compensate by increasing the number of missiles at higher
states of launch readiness.76 Even worse, if deploying NMD seriously dam-
aged U.S. relations with Russia, Russian military leaders would be more likely
to believe that a false alarm was real, and would be more likely to order an im-
mediate retaliatory strike. They might also be more willing to devolve launch
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authority to lower levels, to guard against the possibility of a decapitating U.S.
attack. Thus the overall risk of erroneous or unauthorized attacks probably
would increase as a result of deploying a limited NMD system.
Cooperative measures could reduce the risk of erroneous or unauthorized
use far more effectively than limited NMD. For example, the United States
could help Russia improve its attack warning systems or share uncensored
data from U.S. sensors. Both countries also could agree to install systems that
would allow leaders to destroy missiles launched in error or without authori-
zation.77 Better still would be measures to reduce the threat that U.S. and Rus-
sian forces pose to each other’s nuclear forces, leadership, and command and
control systems, given that this threat drives both sides to maintain large nu-
clear arsenals ready to be launched on warning of attack. Such measures could
include deep cuts in offensive forces, veriable reductions in launch readiness,
and changes in declaratory doctrine.
In summary, the probability of a rogue attack should be very low, and lim-
ited NMD would enhance deterrence only if such states had survivable ICBMs,
which is highly unlikely. If deterrence fails, even a moderately effective NMD
could limit damage in case of rogue-state attack. It is possible, however, that
this benet would be more than offset by increases in the probability of unau-
thorized and erroneous Russian launches, and we believe that limited NMD
would offer little or no protection against most such launches. If one concludes
that NMD provides net benets against rogue and accidental attacks, then the
United States might want to deploy NMD as a type of insurance against low-
probability events that could be extremely costly. Even then, the United States
should buy this insurance only if the international political and strategic costs
are not too large.
International Political Costs of Limited NMD
The largest costs of limited U.S. NMD are likely to be its negative impact on
U.S. relations with Russia and China. For essentially the same reasons that in-
tentional competition with Russia and China would work against U.S. inter-
ests, so would unintended competition generated by limited NMD directed at
rogues. Both countries would have legitimate strategic reasons for seeing even
limited U.S. NMD as a threat to their abilities to meet reasonable nuclear re-
quirements. The United States needs to be innovative in designing policies that
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would reduce the strategic costs imposed on Russia and China, which could in
turn make it less likely that these countries would impute malign motives to
limited U.S. NMD.
We describe a variety of such approaches that go well beyond the limited co-
operation proposed by the Clinton administration and that could provide
much of the “new framework” called for by President Bush. In theory, these
policies have the potential to signicantly reduce the strategic costs that U.S.
NMD would impose on Russia, and possibly China. Although these policies
have a sound strategic logic, in practice there are reasons for worrying that the
states involved, including the United States, would be unable to sustain an
even-handed interpretation of opposing programs and would instead focus
primarily on the threatening elements of complicated cooperative policies. In
this case, the end result would be substantial international political costs in-
stead of successful sophisticated cooperation.
russian security and prestige
Russian leaders have repeatedly and consistently declared their strong opposi-
tion to U.S. deployment of even limited NMD and to amending the ABM
treaty. Russian leaders hold that the ABM treaty is the core of strategic arms
control and that a U.S. decision to proceed with NMD would risk a new arms
race. Russia has made its willingness to proceed with the reductions called for
by START II, as well as further reductions to 1,500 deployed strategic war-
heads, contingent on U.S. adherence to the ABM treaty.78
Russian concerns about limited U.S. NMD fall into six categories. First, Rus-
sia may fear that limited NMD would undermine condence in the retaliatory
capability of its current forces. This problem would stem not from the size
of its strategic forces compared to U.S. NMD but from their vulnerability to
attack. With more than 6,000 deployed warheads (or even the 1,500 to 2,500
warheads identied as a target for START III), the Russian strategic force
dwarfs the proposed U.S. NMD, but if attacked on little warning and at current
day-to-day alert levels, Russia could be left with only about 150 warheads,
which would then have to penetrate U.S. NMD.79 How much weight Russia
should give to this scenario is debatable: A U.S. surprise attack is extremely
unlikely, especially given the improved quality of post–Cold War politics; on
National Missile Defense 73
78. See, for example, Igor Ivanov, “The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability
and the ABM Treaty,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 5 (September/October 2000), pp. 15–20.
79. Jerome Bracken, James Scouras, and Victor A. Utgoff, “Offense-Defense Strategic Nuclear De-
terrent Stability: Summary and Conclusions,” Institute for Defense Analyses (Alexandria, Va.: Oc-
tober 1998); and Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defense and Strategic Stability, p. 83.
the other hand, the United States judges the adequacy of its own forces in these
terms.
Second, Russia assesses its nuclear capabilities by a more demanding stan-
dard than the one we have used, so limited NMD would appear still more
threatening. We have emphasized countervalue retaliatory capabilities—the
ability to inict damage on U.S. society. Although the logic of the “nuclear rev-
olution” shows that counterforce capabilities are relatively unimportant, U.S.
and Soviet military leaders never accepted this logic; the Russian military is
likely to assess its nuclear force in terms of its counterforce capability.80 In ad-
dition, Russian analysts now believe that Russia requires a war-ghting capa-
bility for controlling and de-escalating regional conicts.81 Limited NMD
would more signicantly reduce Russia’s condence in its ability to perform
these missions than in its ability to destroy U.S. society.
Third, Russia likely fears that the planned limited deployment would pro-
vide the United States with the infrastructure and experience to eld a larger
and more advanced NMD system in the future. Thus, even if the proposed lim-
ited NMD system would not undermine Russian retaliatory capabilities, agree-
ing to limited NMD would reduce Russia’s ability to respond effectively to a
future deployment of more ambitious NMD.82 In addition, Russia could rea-
sonably fear that high-altitude TMD systems, which the United States is plan-
ning to build in large numbers, could be integrated into its NMD architecture,
thereby enabling the United States to quickly increase the capability of its
NMD. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has concluded that the Navy
Theater-Wide TMD system now under development would, if integrated
with planned NMD sensors, be able to intercept rogue ICBMs; with a higher-
velocity interceptor, it would be able to intercept Russian or Chinese missiles.83
Fourth, even if the Bush administration favored amending rather than aban-
doning the ABM treaty, Russia would be worried that amending the ABM
treaty to allow limited NMD would set a precedent that would support the
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eventual elimination of negotiated limits on NMD. Having succeeded in get-
ting the ABM treaty altered once, what would stop the United States from in-
sisting on further loosening of restrictions again and again?84 Because much of
the value of a treaty lies in the belief that parties will abide by its terms, U.S. in-
sistence on amending the ABM treaty would reduce the value that Russia
would place on an amended treaty.
Fifth, Russia is probably concerned about the symbolic implications of U.S.
NMD. Although Russian nuclear forces have decayed since the end of the Cold
War, Russia remains roughly equal to the United States, at least in terms of the
items that are counted in strategic arms control agreements. Even limited
NMD threatens to tarnish this image of parity, because only the United States
would have a modern NMD system.85
Finally, responding to U.S. NMD would require Russia to increase spending
on strategic nuclear forces at a time when resources are scarce and much of the
Russian nuclear force is nearing the end of its useful lifetime.86
Skeptics argue that Russia is exaggerating its concerns about U.S. NMD;
they point to the decline in the readiness and survivability of Russian nuclear
forces as evidence that Moscow is in fact unconcerned about its ability to deter
the United States. There is, however, ample evidence that Russia remains com-
mitted to maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent and therefore would be
threatened by NMD that might undermine this capability. Russia continuously
maintains a small force capable of surviving a surprise U.S. attack and strug-
gles to maintain the capability to launch a much larger force on warning of a
U.S. attack. In addition, even though Russian defense spending has declined
dramatically and its conventional forces require large investments, Russia is
deploying a new mobile ICBM intended to preserve the ability of its nuclear
forces to survive a U.S. rst strike.
Although there may appear to be an inconsistency between arguing that
full-scale NMD would be ineffective against Russian countermeasures and ar-
guing that even limited NMD would strain U.S. relations with Russia, this cir-
cle is easy to square. Russia is likely to employ worst-case analysis in assessing
the adequacy of its core deterrent capabilities, giving the benet of the doubt to
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deployed and future U.S. systems. The result could be reduced Russian
condence in its nuclear forces, even though NMD was actually ineffective
against them. Moreover, by deploying NMD, the United States would commu-
nicate that it believes NMD is effective against countermeasures, at least the
simple countermeasures available to emerging missile states. This could con-
tribute to Russian doubts about the effectiveness of its nuclear forces, or at
least reduce Russian condence that the United States appreciated that its
NMD would be ineffective against countermeasures. Russia would then con-
clude that its responses had to go beyond simple countermeasures, if only to
ensure that the United States did not underestimate Russian capabilities.
In short, American deployment of limited NMD promises to impose strate-
gic, political, and economic costs on Russia. In proposing to abandon the ABM
treaty, the United States is asking Russia to accept a strategic arrangement that
it nds substantially less desirable than existing limitations. Therefore Russia
is likely to interpret the administration’s stated willingness to walk away from
the treaty as an indication of America’s threatening intentions.
approaches for reducing russian political and strategic costs
The Clinton administration reportedly attempted to make amending the ABM
treaty more attractive to Russia, including offering to help the Russians im-
prove their early warning network, share early warning information, and en-
gage in condence-building measures.87 President Bush has referred to similar
approaches, but so far has offered few details. We explore a set of more ambi-
tious measures and conclude that they should be integrated into U.S. policy, as
a necessary (although not sufcient) condition for proceeding with limited
NMD.
deploy nmd that does not threaten russian forces. The simplest way
to avoid provoking Russia would be to deploy an NMD system that lacked ca-
pability against Russian missiles. The key example of such an NMD is a land-
or sea-based boost-phase system, which could destroy only missiles launched
within a limited distance from where it was deployed. If deployed near rogue
states, these systems would not pose a threat to Russian or Chinese systems,
because they would be out of range.88 In addition to this important political
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could benet from active Russian participation . Although there would be large potential political
advantage, the technical challenges confronting land- and sea-based boost-
phase systems are much smaller than those facing the current U.S. hit-to-kill
system. Thus, if the United States decides limited NMD is necessary, the case
for a boost-phase system appears to be doubly strong.
Some proponents of NMD will argue that a surface-based boost-phase sys-
tem is inadequate because it would not provide protection against accidental
Russian launches and therefore will support boost-phase NMD only as part of
a layered defense. As we argued above, however, a limited midcourse NMD is
likely to provide little protection against this danger and could increase it. Ad-
ditionally, the United States has alternatives to NMD that are more promising.
Although a surface-based boost-phase system would not threaten Russia’s
nuclear capabilities, Russia might nevertheless see risks in the deployment of
even this type of system. Testing and deploying a surface-based boost-phase
system would require amendment of the ABM treaty, which would generate
Russian concerns about further erosion of restrictions on NMD. In addition,
Russia is likely to fear that a U.S. decision to deploy any type of NMD would
generate momentum for deployment of other types of NMD, because the deci-
sion to proceed would be widely understood as endorsing NMD more gener-
ally. To reduce these worries, if the United States decides to deploy a surface-
based boost-phase system, it should commit itself not to build a layered
defense that would add midcourse systems. Russia is unlikely to be entirely
reassured by this commitment, so there will be some political costs to deploy-
ing even this least threatening type of NMD.
integrate nmd into an offense-defense agreement. If restricting NMD
to surface-based boost-phase systems proves politically infeasible, the United
States should pursue cooperative policies to reduce the threat posed by the
NMD system it deploys. An arms control agreement that integrated limits on
offensive and midcourse defensive forces would reduce, if not eliminate, a
number of Russia’s key concerns. Such an agreement would set a ceiling on
the number of deployed warheads plus the number of deployed interceptors
(possibly scaled by a fraction reecting estimates of the effectiveness of the in-
terceptors).89 The basic rationale for an integrated agreement is that NMD in-
terceptors reduce the adversary’s retaliatory capability. If certain to destroy an
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incoming warhead, then an interceptor reduces the effective size of the oppos-
ing force by one warhead; if less successful, the adversary’s force is effectively
reduced by some fraction of a warhead.90 Therefore one way to compensate for
U.S. NMD is to reduce U.S. retaliatory capabilities at the same time that the
United States is reducing Russian retaliatory capabilities with its NMD.
Unlike the Clinton and Bush proposals for amending or abandoning the
ABM treaty, this approach would enable Washington to offer Moscow a deal
that did not clearly leave Russia worse off than the current arms control
regime. In return for Russian acceptance of limited U.S. NMD, the United
States would agree to reduce disproportionately the size of its strategic nuclear
force, granting Russia the option of having a strategic nuclear force larger than
the U.S. force.91 By creating compensating asymmetries, an integrated offense-
defense agreement would reduce Russia’s symbolic concerns about accepting a
revised agreement that left Russia unable to match the United States. Russian
concerns about the precedent set by agreeing to amend the ABM treaty might
also be alleviated, because the United States would have committed itself to
an agreement that could accommodate further growth in U.S. NMD without
requiring renegotiation and while addressing at least some of Russia’s key
concerns.
The details of an integrated agreement could vary along a number of dimen-
sions. The rst issue is the total size of offensive and defensive forces. As long
as offensive forces are large (greater than 1,000 warheads), there is no magic
level for the total number of offensive and defensive strategic weapons; the
levels commonly discussed for START III (1,500 to 2,500 warheads) are an ob-
vious possibility. A second issue is whether offensive and defensive weapons
should count equally against this aggregate limit. Given that defensive weap-
ons will not be perfectly effective, the agreement might discount them by a
fraction that reects their expected effectiveness.92 In practice, however, agree-
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ing on how much defense should be discounted promises to be controversial,
because Russian planners will be inclined to make worst-case assessments. The
United States should accept an agreement that counts defensive interceptors
and offensive warheads equally. This would not pose a problem at the force
levels envisioned for START III, but it would be problematic if truly deep cuts
become a possibility.
A third feature of an integrated agreement might be a separate ceiling on the
number of interceptors. A ceiling on NMD would help give Russia condence
that U.S. NMD is directed at small threats, not the Russian arsenal, and could
reduce fears that the United States was laying the foundation for a defensive
breakout from the agreement. The upper end of the proposed Clinton plan
(250 interceptors) might be a natural place to set such a ceiling, but if a smaller
number of interceptors would be sufcient to defend against projected rogue
threats, then the United States should agree to a lower limit, possibly 100 inter-
ceptors.93 A lower ceiling would provide Russia with greater condence that
U.S. aims were limited. Alternatively, the ceiling on NMD could be linked to
the size of rogue forces, starting with a number that was judged adequate for
defending against currently projected rogue forces, but that would increase if
these forces grew beyond these projections.
reduce the u.s. counterforce threat to russian forces. Although an
integrated offense-defense agreement would help solve many of the problems
created by limited NMD, it would not address the most serious problem: the
vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear force. If Russian forces were highly surviv-
able, limited U.S. NMD would not pose a realistic threat to Russia’s retaliatory
capabilities. Russian forces, however, increasingly fail to meet reasonable nu-
clear force planning requirements, although the dangers this poses are reduced
by the relatively good relations between the United States and Russia. U.S. of-
fers to help Russia ll gaps in its attack warning network were intended to re-
duce Russian vulnerability to surprise attack.
To further reduce the threat posed by limited NMD, the United States
should unilaterally decrease the counterforce threat it poses to Russian forces.
Among U.S. options are replacing high-yield missile warheads with lower-
yield ones and reducing the launch readiness of U.S. strategic missiles.94 Even
if the United States pursues these policies, Russia will need to modernize its
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forces to maintain a reasonably survivable force, with mobile ICBMs probably
its best option.95 The cost of maintaining a survivable deterrent could be re-
duced by allowing mobile ICBMs to carry multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Although banned by START II and commonly ar-
gued to be dangerous, if mobile missiles are survivable, allowing them to be
MIRVed would not increase incentives to preempt in a crisis.96
Reducing the U.S. threat to Russian forces would produce two related
benets. First, as already discussed, a limited U.S. NMD would not pose a seri-
ous threat to a reasonably survivable force of more than 1,000 warheads, so
reducing the U.S. counterforce threat should make NMD more acceptable
to Russia, especially to military planners responsible for judging Russian
forces against demanding scenarios. Second, U.S. willingness to pursue these
measures, combined with the asymmetry allowed by the integrated offense-
defense agreement, should indicate to Russia that U.S. NMD is not intended to
undermine Russian retaliatory capabilities.
constrain u.s. ability to break out of nmd limits. Russia is likely to
worry that limited NMD would provide the United States with the ability to
quickly expand its missile defense. Once the radars, satellites, and command,
control, and communications systems are deployed, integrated, and tested to
provide an effective nationwide defense, the United States could quickly ex-
pand its NMD to handle larger attacks simply by adding interceptors, and pos-
sibly by integrating existing TMD interceptors into the NMD system. An
integrated offense-defense agreement would reduce the threat posed by this
expansion, because the United States would be required to retire an offensive
warhead for each additional NMD interceptor it deployed. Russia, however, is
unlikely to assume that the United States would be restrained indenitely by
the integrated agreement. Russia would desire the ability to respond unilater-
ally to U.S. NMD breakout from the offense-defense agreement.
Consequently, the new arms control regime should erect barriers against
U.S. NMD breakout and enable Russia to respond quickly if necessary.
This may prove difcult, because, at least given current American advantages
in military-industrial capability, the U.S. ability to build defense interceptors
would likely dwarf Russia’s ability to build intercontinental-range nuclear
systems.
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An arms control agreement that allowed Russia to keep a certain number of
warheads in storage, instead of requiring the destruction of all warheads not
deployed on allowed missile systems, would increase Russia’s ability to re-
spond to American NMD breakout.97 If the United States ever launched a
rapid NMD buildup, Russia could then quickly add these warheads to missiles
that it had already deployed. Another option for increasing Russian condence
would be to allow Russia to monitor American production of NMD intercep-
tors, thereby providing assurance that the United States was not preparing to
break out of the arms control agreement. Finally, the United States might con-
sider limits on the number, type, or deployment of sensors that support the
NMD system. If the sensor network is not robust, Russia might be condent
that it could defeat the NMD system by attacking the sensors, regardless of
how many interceptors were deployed. The United States, however, is likely to
oppose limits on sensors because this would constrain the ability of its NMD to
cope with countermeasures.
Our call for extensive cooperation on NMD should not be confused with
giving Russia a veto on U.S. policy. Russian leaders may see domestic and in-
ternational political advantages in rejecting cooperative U.S. proposals, regard-
less of the threat NMD poses to Russian forces. In this case, the United States
could deploy NMD with the reasonable hope that Russia recognized its efforts
to communicate benign intentions.
china
China, like Russia, has strongly opposed U.S. deployment of limited NMD.98
U.S. options for reducing China’s concerns are different and less extensive than
for reducing Russian concerns, because China’s nuclear force is very small.
China currently deploys about 20 single-warhead ICBMs, which are unfueled
and not mated with warheads.
Unless U.S. NMD is a surface-based boost-phase system, China would fear
that 100 to 250 NMD interceptors would nullify its modest nuclear capability.
Given the current state of U.S.-China relations, U.S. claims that its NMD is ori-
ented only against rogue states will do little to reassure the leadership in
Beijing. China will likely conclude that it requires a nuclear force that can over-
whelm U.S. NMD in a retaliatory strike and react by building a larger force
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than it would have if the United States had not deployed NMD, deploying
countermeasures and possibly MIRVing its missiles.99
In addition, and more worrisome, U.S. NMD would be likely to generate a
negative shift in China’s assessments of U.S. motives, because it would be im-
possible for the United States to demonstrate that its NMD was directed
against rogue states and not China. The Clinton administration plan to deploy
100 NMD inceptors before 2010, and possibly 250 by 2015, would pose a threat
to Chinese retaliatory capabilities, even if China increases its nuclear force at
the rate currently estimated to be feasible, and the more ambitious plan fa-
vored by the Bush administration promises to be still more threatening. If mis-
sile defense of this size were required to defend against projected rogue forces,
then the motives driving U.S. NMD would appear ambiguous to China. Given
that a state that wanted to challenge China would be more likely to build
NMD than one that did not, China would increase its estimate of the probabil-
ity that the United States harbors malign intentions. If, however, U.S. NMD
were clearly larger than required to defend against rogue forces, which seems
likely given the Bush administration’s enthusiasm for NMD, then China
would conclude that U.S. intentions were clearly malign.
Chinese leaders would not have to stretch their imaginations to see ways
that the United States could use NMD to challenge China’s key security con-
cerns. Most obviously, an effective NMD could signicantly reduce China’s
ability to deter American intervention in support of Taiwan, which China con-
siders a renegade province. Chinese leaders will be able to cite U.S. supporters
of NMD that have made this link explicit.100 In addition, NMD is directly
linked to hot-button regional issues through its interaction with TMD—which
China sees as threatening its ability to prevent Taiwan’s move toward inde-
pendence and as playing a signicant role in the evolution of America’s mili-
tary relationship with Japan—which further increases the probability that
China would impute U.S. hostility.
To better appreciate the problem, a closer look at deployment rates and force
requirements is helpful. There is substantial uncertainty in estimates of China’s
current plans for increasing the size of its ICBM force and its ability to acceler-
ate this expansion. Until recently, estimates were that China would likely have
a few tens of ICBMs by 2015,101 with the high range of one set of estimates at 70
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ICBMs.102 An August 2000 National Intelligence Estimate on foreign responses
to U.S. NMD reportedly concluded that China would expand its arsenal in or-
der to overwhelm a limited NMD system, and that China could deploy up to
200 ICBM warheads by 2015.103 We believe that China will try to deploy at
least as many warheads as the number of deployed U.S. NMD interceptors,
subject to production constraints. This might seem an overreaction if China’s
goal was to maintain the capability to deliver a few warheads against U.S. cit-
ies, given that NMD would not work perfectly even under the best conditions.
But this overlooks the vulnerability of Chinese forces and command and con-
trol to an American rst strike, the possibility of a rapid expansion of NMD,
and any desire Beijing might have to hold some nuclear forces in reserve or to
execute more demanding attack options. Finally, even if Chinese leaders un-
derstood that U.S. NMD was imperfect and could be defeated with counter-
measures, they would want to make absolutely clear to U.S. leaders that China
knew it could penetrate the defense. The best way to communicate this would
be to deploy more warheads than the defense could possibly handle.
Once Chinese forces become large enough to overwhelm U.S. NMD, the
United States would be able to credibly demonstrate to China that its NMD is
directed only at rogue states. Assuming rogue-state forces remain small, the
United States would not expand its NMD, even though China’s forces had
grown sufciently large to ensure China’s ability to launch a devastating retal-
iatory attack. Unfortunately, the opportunity to provide this information is
likely to be two decades or more away, and in the interim U.S. NMD would
probably damage America’s relations with China.
The United States should work to reduce these political costs. First, the
smaller the NMD, the sooner China would be able to meet its nuclear require-
ments and the United States would be able to signal its benign intentions.
Therefore, in addition to the standard efciency reasons for not building un-
necessary capability, as part of its policy for managing its relations with China,
the United States should be careful not to deploy an NMD system that is larger
than required for dealing with rogue threats.
Second, the United States should make clear to Chinese leaders and elites
that it understands and accepts that China’s decision to build a nuclear force
capable of overwhelming U.S. NMD is consistent with China’s security re-
quirements and does not reect malign Chinese motives. While not encourag-
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ing China to respond, making clear through ofcial channels, as well as
publicly, that the United States understands and accepts the necessity of the
Chinese nuclear buildup should help to convince China that U.S. NMD is not
directed at it. The United States should take the same attitude if China’s mod-
ernization includes MIRVed ICBMs, which could increase Chinese condence
in their ability to penetrate U.S. NMD, but would not pose a signicant threat
to U.S. retaliatory capabilities. Although China would not gain much con-
dence in U.S. motives until its forces are large enough to overwhelm U.S.
NMD, these U.S. statements might provide some reassurance by making clear
that the United States was not using the Chinese nuclear buildup to fuel sup-
port for more competitive American policies.
the real politics of cooperation: likely misperceptions of nmd
There is likely to be a gap between the rational interactions described above
and the way that international politics actually plays out. Each of the major
powers—the United States, China, and Russia—is likely to exaggerate the
threatening nature of the other’s policies. Consequently, the international polit-
ical costs of U.S. NMD are likely to be signicantly larger than the preceding
discussion suggests.
As argued above, U.S. NMD is likely to convince rational Chinese leaders to
adopt a more malign view of American motives. The impact of NMD is likely
to be still more negative, however, because Chinese leaders are inclined to see
American policy—including support for international institutions and their
universal norms, expansion of U.S. alliances, and improvements in U.S. and al-
lied military capabilities—as designed to prevent China from achieving the
great power status that they believe it deserves. These views are most strongly
held by the Chinese military, which sees the political and military components
of U.S. security policy as reecting “a master plan to achieve global domi-
nance.”104 As a result, instead of recognizing any ambiguity in U.S. motives,
China is likely to conclude that U.S. motives are certainly malign.
Although the prospects that Russia will accurately read American signals
are better than they are with China, there are reasons to be concerned that U.S.
efforts at cooperation would not be fully appreciated. The prospects are better
largely because the United States will be able to present Russia with a variety
of large early concessions. In addition, the prospects for successful communi-
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cation are increased by the extensive experience that the United States and
Russia have interacting on strategic nuclear issues. Nevertheless, Russia may
not be prepared to analyze and react to a complicated mixture of cooperative
and potentially competitive American policies. In a recent assessment of the
prospects for proposals for deep cuts, Alexei Arbatov argued that Russians
with a liberal perspective who possess the necessary strategic and technical ex-
pertise are as numerous as during the Gorbachev era, but that “their relative
weight in the new Russian political elite and strategic community as well as
their ability to nd and use an organized decision-making system are much
weaker than before. They are under the pressure of strong competition from
large numbers of outspoken anti-Western professionals and ignorant politi-
cians and organizations.”105
The United States may also be an important source of misperceptions. China
and Russia are likely to respond in ways that, while necessary to met their
security requirements, will be vulnerable to malign interpretations. The sub-
stantial growth in China’s nuclear force that would be required to overwhelm
U.S. NMD could be interpreted as reecting China’s determination to increase
its regional and global inuence in ways that match or exceed its growing
economic power. Russia’s efforts to make its forces more survivable and
better able to penetrate U.S. NMD could involve deploying MIRVs on
its mobile ICBMs and deploying a new ballistic missile submarine,106 which
could be interpreted as threatening even though they were reactions to U.S.
NMD.
Some inuential players in the American debate will be inclined to draw
misleading negative inferences, either because they already believe that these
countries have malign intentions or because they favor more competitive poli-
cies. The dangers may be greatest for U.S. relations with China, as they are at a
formative stage, with American experts and politicians divided over whether
China will pose a future major threat to the United States.
Proponents of malign interpretations and competitive policies would likely
be able to use misleading arguments to undermine cooperative efforts de-
signed to reassure Russia and China. During the Cold War, a variety of mis-
leading measures of U.S. and Soviet forces were used to argue with some
success that the military threat posed by the Soviet Union was much greater
than it actually was, that Soviet goals were correspondingly more hostile, and
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that the United States should respond with more competitive policies of its
own.107 Given the scope, intensity, and importance of the Cold War debate on
U.S. nuclear policy, we have little reason to be condent that a future debate in-
volving U.S. NMD would be resistant to these types of distortions.
A related, second challenge for the United States would be to remain com-
mitted to a cooperative policy of limited NMD. Even if the United States
adopts the types of initiatives we have described above, staying on this cooper-
ative path promises to be difcult. Avoiding signicant damage to its relations
with Russia and China requires the United States to adopt a cooperative policy
not only at the outset, but for the foreseeable future.
The interaction between U.S. NMD and Russian and Chinese policies is
likely to provide Americans who favor competitive policies with opportunities
to undermine cooperation. Russian and Chinese reactions will be open to
threatening, albeit misleading, interpretations. If these interpretations gain
political weight, support for preserving cooperative NMD policies would
signicantly weaken, because cooperation makes less sense with a state that is
understood to be threatening and expansionist than with one that is under-
stood to be insecure. Consequently, an American policy of limited NMD is
likely to lack endurance. Deciding to support limited NMD because initially
the United States is prepared to cooperate to reduce its international political
costs is therefore risky.
Impact of NMD on Deep Cuts and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
A U.S. decision about limited NMD should include an assessment of its effects
on possible longer-term U.S. strategic nuclear goals, including deep reductions
in nuclear forces and the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons. Although
these objectives are not achievable in the near term, we consider them here be-
cause a U.S. decision to deploy limited NMD could represent a lasting commit-
ment to missile defenses.
Whether slowing progress toward deep cuts or the prohibition of nuclear
weapons should count as a large cost depends on prior judgments about the
desirability of these goals. This brief discussion is intended narrowly to ex-
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plain that NMD would reduce the prospects for achieving these radical
changes in nuclear force postures.
Ofcial U.S. policy has indicated little interest in achieving very deep reduc-
tions or the prohibition of nuclear forces. There are reports of willingness to go
as low as 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads, but not the 1,000 to 1,500
that Russia prefers.108 (Note that several thousand nonstrategic and
nondeployed warheads would not be included in these limits.) In contrast,
some experts have laid out the case for pursuing agreements that would re-
duce total U.S. warheads to around 200; at such low levels, arms control agree-
ments would have to be multilateral, including China, France, and Britain, as
well as Russia.109 While some experts see these low levels as the nal goal of
nuclear arms control, others see the prohibition of nuclear weapons as the de-
sirable long-term goal, with deep cuts as an essential stage along the way.
Deploying limited missile defense would increase the difculty of achieving
very low warhead levels. The key barriers would be uncertainty about the ef-
fectiveness of the NMD system and the possibility of NMD breakout. Consid-
er, for example, the goal of reducing to 200 warheads in the context of an
integrated offense-defense agreement. If the United States deployed 200 war-
heads and 200 NMD interceptors, Russia would maintain 400 warheads. If
each NMD interceptor was known with certainty to offset one warhead, this
asymmetric arrangement would be largely equivalent to an agreement in
which both countries cut their forces to 200 warheads. At these low levels,
however, the United States and Russia would likely nd it much harder to
agree that an interceptor should count as one warhead. Russia would make
worst-case assessments about the reliability and survivability of its offensive
forces and about the effectiveness of the U.S. NMD system, as would the
United States, which undoubtedly would lead each to conclude that the agree-
ment would leave it at a substantial disadvantage. In contrast, when the num-
ber of warheads is much larger than the number of NMD interceptors, these
uncertainties are less important. Thus the prospects for an integrated offense-
defense agreement are much better at high force levels, and limited NMD is
much more likely to be a barrier to deep cuts than to an agreement at START III
levels.
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The possibility of NMD breakout would be a second barrier to deep cuts.
Russia would worry that the United States could quickly expand its limited
NMD, thereby undermining Russian deterrent capabilities. Although poten-
tially threatening at START III levels, breakout poses a much larger threat to a
small force.
Some proponents believe that NMD can help make possible the prohibition
of nuclear weapons by reducing their value and by reducing the risks of cheat-
ing. Three basic points show that these hopes are misplaced. First, the funda-
mental requirement for nuclear disarmament is that the countries involved
have outstanding, robust political relations. NMD is likely to strain U.S. rela-
tions with other major powers, thereby reducing the prospects for prohibition.
Second, in a disarmed world, ballistic missiles would not be the most worri-
some means of delivering hidden warheads. In fact, long-range ballistic mis-
siles probably would be banned along with nuclear weapons, while other
types of delivery vehicles—combat aircraft, submarines, and ships—would be
readily available. In this situation, NMD would not be viewed as an important
safeguard, because it would protect against only the slowest form of breakout.
Third, even if breakout with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles was an important
concern, NMD would probably increase concerns about breakout. Countries
would need condence that their NMD was at least as effective as other coun-
tries’ and that they could expand their NMD at least as quickly in a rearma-
ment race. NMD would likely increase countries’ uncertainty about the
adequacy of their rearmament capabilities, making them less willing to disarm
in the rst place.110
Summary and Policy Implications
The danger posed by emerging missile threats is smaller than generally be-
lieved, because the threats do not yet exist; the threats may be slowed, if not
prevented entirely, through diplomatic means; and, if they do develop, can
probably be deterred. The value of limited NMD is further reduced by the
possibility that emerging missile states would deliver WMD by alternative
means.
Even so, a role exists for limited NMD because rogue states might not be
willing or able to employ alternative means of delivery, and because it is possi-
ble that deterrence could fail. If effective, the key benet of limited NMD
would be its ability to reduce the damage that a rogue attack could inict on
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the United States. Limited NMD is unlikely to provide the other benets that
are frequently listed by proponents: It would not enhance deterrence of rogue
attacks; it would provide little protection against erroneous or unauthorized
Russian attacks, and might increase their likelihood; and it would not restore
leeway to U.S. foreign policy when facing WMD-armed foes. Against these
bounded benets must be weighed the potential international political costs of
NMD.
Among the options for limited NMD, the case for surface-based boost-phase
NMD is strongest. This type of system appears to have the best prospects for
working against emerging missile threats. In addition, the geographical con-
straints on its effectiveness should help the United States avoid increasing the
threat it poses to Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities and thereby avoid
severely damaging relations with these major powers. Even this least threaten-
ing type of NMD would nevertheless generate security concerns, because
Beijing and Moscow would fear that these deployments would build momen-
tum for more advanced and effective layered defenses.
Whether the benets provided by boost-phase NMD are sufciently large to
justify the system’s economic costs is harder to say. If NMD could be made ef-
fective against rogue missiles and at the same time can be insulated from U.S.
relations with major powers, then NMD becomes a question of efciency: Are
there better uses—military or nonmilitary—for the tens of billions of dollars
that a surface-based boost-phase system would cost?
Although some proponents have called for the United States to deploy a
boost-phase NMD system as quickly as possible, the United States is better off
taking the time required to develop a system that has a high probability of
working. The only near-term solution to the emerging missile threat is to elimi-
nate it diplomatically. Although it appears headed in the opposite direction,
the Bush administration should vigorously pursue negotiations with North
Korea. Although no agreement will be entirely airtight, uncertainties in the
verication of prohibitions on North Korea’s long-range missile program are
likely to be far smaller than uncertainties in the effectiveness of U.S. NMD
against an unconstrained North Korean missile program. If Pyongyang’s pro-
gram can be stopped, the United States will have still more time to develop a
highly capable boost-phase system as insurance against emerging missile
threats that might materialize in the more distant future.
In contrast, the case against proceeding with deployment of a midcourse
NMD system is powerful. The planned hit-to-kill system is unlikely to have
much capability against reactive emerging missile states, and effective U.S. re-
actions to countermeasures are unlikely to be available. More important,
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midcourse NMD promises to strain U.S. relations with Russia and China, quite
possibly severely.
Even though midcourse NMD would reduce U.S. security, some mix of po-
litical momentum toward deployment, optimism about the potential of U.S.
technology, and awed beliefs that competition with Russia and China is not
dangerous could lead the United States to proceed with deployment anyway.
If the United States decides to defend against Russia and China, there is little
that it can do to moderate the international political costs. This policy would
be both futile and self-defeating. If, however, the United States proceeds with
midcourse NMD to protect against emerging missile states, then it has avail-
able a variety of approaches for signicantly reducing NMD’s international
political costs, including constraints on U.S. counterforce capability, an arms
control agreement that integrates limits on offensive and defensive forces, and
measures to constrain breakout from these limits.
The key danger with a policy of cooperative, limited NMD is that coopera-
tion would unravel and limited NMD would turn out to be the rst step
down the path toward full-scale NMD. Proponents of limited NMD who op-
pose full-scale NMD should make their support contingent on reasonable
condence that the limited and cooperative nature of U.S. policy can be pre-
served. Gaining this condence promises to be difcult, given that limited
NMD would be likely to generate interactions that fuel more competitive
American policies.
A sustained national debate over the objectives of NMD could help deter-
mine the prospects for a wide and deep consensus on keeping NMD limited,
thereby providing insights into the political stability of a limited NMD policy.
If inuential players continue to be interested in NMD for protecting against
deliberate Russian and Chinese attacks, then the prospects would be poor. On
the other hand, if the arguments against full-scale NMD were clearly articu-
lated and accepted across the political spectrum, this would establish some-
thing of a barrier to abandoning cooperation and moving beyond limited
NMD.
Another indicator of the stability of a cooperative, limited NMD policy
would be whether national security elites across the political spectrum are
sufciently sensitive to the security concerns that midcourse NMD could gen-
erate for Russia and China. This could be gauged in terms of their willingness
to support the types of cooperative policies described above. If there is not
broad-based support for pursuing this full range of cooperative options, lim-
ited NMD policies are likely to lack political stability.
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If the United States proceeds with limited midcourse NMD, opponents of
full-scale NMD should work to reduce the probability that awed political and
strategic analysis will fuel a classical spiral of exaggerated hostility. Russia and
China are inclined to misread U.S. motives, even if the United States promotes
cooperative policies, and the United States may be equally inclined to misread
Russian and Chinese reactions, which could in turn undermine American sup-
port for the cooperative elements of its policy. Consequently, U.S. policy for
managing the politics of NMD should include efforts to bring the international
political impacts of a cooperative NMD policy into line with the actual strate-
gic impacts.
Obviously, the United States has the greatest potential for inuencing the
quality of its own debate and assessment. Probably most important, the United
States needs to prepare itself from the outset not to misinterpret China’s reac-
tion to U.S. NMD. As part of the process of deciding to proceed with limited
NMD, U.S. political leaders and security experts should do as much as possible
to anticipate and explain China’s likely reactions, including establishing
boundaries within which China’s reaction would not provide grounds for the
United States to impute malign intentions. This national-level discourse would
require U.S. leaders to address the question of the potential role of nuclear
weapons in contributing to the security of major powers. Certainly the United
States, which continues to argue that it needs 2,500 or more warheads to meet
its deterrence requirements, is in no position to argue that China does not re-
quire a retaliatory capability on the order of 200 warheads. If the United States
deploys a limited NMD, it should be prepared to accept that China could de-
cide it needs hundreds of reasonably survivable strategic warheads. If Ameri-
can elites cannot accept this, then the United States is likely to greatly
exaggerate the Chinese threat. The political costs of limited NMD would then
be much higher than a narrow strategic analysis would suggest.
The U.S. ability to inuence Russian and Chinese assessments is much more
limited. Ambitious cooperative American proposals might bolster the
inuence of informed, pro-Western players in Russia. The United States has
less to offer China, but it should nevertheless engage the Chinese in ofcial
discussions, stressing that its NMD is directed only against rogues, that it ac-
cepts that substantial increases in Chinese nuclear forces are consistent with
China’s security requirements, and that it will not increase the size of its NMD
or otherwise overreact to a reasonable modernization and expansion of Chi-
nese strategic forces. Beyond communicating that the United States is aware of
China’s legitimate security concerns, ofcial interactions might contribute to
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growth in the Chinese arms control community, which could contribute to a
more balanced assessment of U.S. motives.111
The barriers to successfully implementing the ambitious cooperative policies
that are required to minimize the international political costs of midcourse
NMD are quite high. Appreciating these challenges reinforces the already
strong case against proceeding down this path.
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